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I. INTRODUCTION: CURBING 
COVID-19 CONSTITUTIONALLY 
AND THE ELUSION OF  
POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITY
1. Federal Epidemics Acts: three-tier 
approach
When COVID-19 reached Switzerland at 
the end of February 2020, the Federal Act 
of 28 September 2012 on Combating Com-
municable Human Diseases (Epidemics Act, 
EpA)’1 had been in place for more than four 
years. Previously, the EpA, whose aim is to 
‘prevent and combat the outbreak and spread 
of communicable diseases’2, was subject to 
intense political debates culminating in a ref-
erendum on 22 September 2013.3 After 60% 
of voters approved the bill, the EpA entered 
into force on 1 January 2016. The EpA set a 
three-tier approach in place, distinguishing 
between ‘normal’, ‘special’ and ‘extraordi-
nary’ epidemiological situations. Accord-
ingly, an aggravation of the epidemiological 
circumstances leads, based on a respective 
decision by the executive branch of the 
federal government (Federal Council) to a 
transfer of governmental tasks and responsi-
bilities from the cantons (constituent states) 
to the Federation (federal government) on 
the one hand and from Federal Parliament 
(legislative branch) to the Federal Council 
(executive branch) on the other hand. The 
more the epidemiological situation escalates, 
the more power is being concentrated in the 
Federal Council. According to the EpA, a 
‘special situation’ exists when the authorities 
responsible for the prevention and combat-
ing of communicable diseases prove unable 
to prevent the outbreak and spread of such 
diseases, resulting in either an increased risk 
of infection and spread, a particular threat to 
public health or detrimental effects on the 
economy or on other areas of life.4 
A ‘special situation’ also exists should the 
World Health Organization (WHO) identify 
an international health emergency threaten-
ing the health of the population in Switzer-
land. Such a ‘special situation’ allows the 
Federal Council, after consulting the can-
tons, to order ‘measures’ aimed at individ-
uals or at the population as a whole to re-
quire doctors and other health professionals 
to participate in the fight against communi-
cable diseases and to declare vaccinations 
compulsory for particular vulnerable groups 
of persons.5 The most aggravated state of af-
fairs – the ‘extraordinary situation’ – allows 
the Federal Council ‘to impose the necessary 
measures for all or part of the country’, with-
out consulting the cantons.6 Despite these 
sweeping powers, the EpA remains silent as 
to the definition of an ‘extraordinary situa-
tion’. In his dispatch to the Federal Parlia-
ment on the EpA, the Federal Council stated 
that the relevant clause is but a declaration of 
the emergency powers the executive branch 
of the federal government holds under the 
1 “Federal Act on Combating Communicable Human Diseases” (Epidemics Act, EpA), Classified Compilation 
of Swiss Federal Law (SR) 818.101. Available at: <https://www.fedlex.admin.ch/eli/cc/2015/297/fr> (official 
French version), (28 September 2012).
2 Ibid, article 2 section 1 (outlining the purpose of the Act).
3 See Swiss Federal Chancellery, ‘Federal Act on the Control of Communicable Human Diseases’. Available at: 
<https://www.bk.admin.ch/ch/f/pore/rf/cr/2007/20071012.html>  (in German, French, and Italian).
4 EpA (n. 1 above) article 6 section 1a.
5 EpA (n. 1 above) article 6 section 2.
6 EpA (n. 1 above) article 7.
294 | I•CONnect-Clough Center 
Swiss Federal Constitution (Federal Con-
stitution)7. These powers allow the Federal 
Council ‘to enact orders and take decisions 
in order to counter existing or imminent dis-
turbances seriously threatening either public 
order or external or internal security’8. All 
such orders ‘must be limited in time.’9 As in 
most other areas of federal law, it is general-
ly for the cantons to implement the measures 
imposed by the Federal Council during both 
‘special’ and ‘extraordinary’ situations.
2. The first wave: emergency loans as a pub-
lic-private partnership
Based on this legal framework, the Federal 
Council declared the epidemiological situa-
tion to be ‘special’ and banned all large-scale 
events involving more than 1,000 people on 
28 February 2020.10 On 16 March 2020, the 
federal executive branch went further and, 
amid the accelerated spread of COVID-19, 
proclaimed the ‘extraordinary situation’.11 
The Federal Council introduced stringent 
measures such as border checks and the clos-
ing of shops, restaurants, bars and entertain-
ment and leisure facilities, prohibited public 
gatherings of more than five people and did 
not order but ‘recommended’ all citizens to 
stay home. When administering emergency 
loans to small businesses, the Federal Coun-
cil, based on its constitutional emergency 
powers, took the unique approach to enter 
into close collaboration with more than 120 
Swiss commercial banks.12  With a simple 
declaration of one page, small and mid-size 
enterprises could apply for an immediate and 
interest-free loan worth up to 10% of their an-
nual revenue, capped at Swiss Francs (CHF) 
500,000 (approx. United States dollars [USD] 
560,000 or Euros [EUR] 460,000). These 
loans were provided by a Swiss bank, un-
derwritten with a full credit guarantee on the 
amount by the federal government.
Of higher amounts up to CHF 20 million 
(approx. USD 22.3 million/EUR 18.4 mil-
lion), 85% each were guaranteed by the fed-
eral government, charged at 0.5% interest 
and again provided by a Swiss commercial 
bank. Running the scheme through the ex-
isting network of commercial banks based 
on existing customer relationships proved 
crucial for the initial success of the program, 
as the banks could rely on both the cred-
it history and data of their clients. Within a 
week, more than 70,000 small and mid-size 
businesses received a loan through this pub-
lic-private partnership.13 
Soon after the first wave of COVID-19 sub-
sided towards the end of May 202014 the Fed-
eral Council declared the ‘extraordinary sit-
uation’ to be terminated as of 19 June 2020, 
lifted most of the remaining restrictions, 
proclaimed the ‘special situation’ and thus 
handed most of the tasks and responsibili-
ties in controlling and combating COVID-19 
back to the cantons.15 Regarding separation 
of powers at the federal level the extraordi-
nary powers granted to the Federal Council 
to combat the COVID-19 epidemic are, as of 
26 September 2020, enshrined in the ‘Feder-
al COVID-19 Act’ decided by Federal Par-
liament on 25 September 2020 and passed as 
an emergency federal statutory law.16 As of 
1 October 2020, the last relevant restrictive 
measure imposed by the Federation still in 
place – the ban on large-scale events for over 
1,000 people – was lifted.17 With the benefit 
of hindsight, it is difficult not to acknowl-
edge that most restrictions were lifted both 
prematurely and hastily.
3. The second wave: elusion of political 
accountability and blame-shifting 
During the second half of October, the labo-
ratory-confirmed cases, hospitalizations and 
deaths due to COVID-19 rose dramatically 
once again and peaked in mid-November 
2020. This ‘second wave’ of the COVID-19 
pandemic hit Switzerland worse than the 
first one. As of 19 February 2021, Switzer-
land accounted for 6,336 laboratory-con-
firmed cases and 106.42 deaths with a lab-
oratory-confirmed COVID-19 infection per 
100,000 inhabitants.18 Based on cumulative 
confirmed COVID-19 deaths per million 
7 Swiss Federal Constitution (Federal Constitution), SR 101, (18 April 1999), Available at: <https://www.admin.ch/opc/en/classified-compilation/19995395/index.html> 
(non-official English translation).
8 Federal Constitution (n. 7 above) article 185 section 3 sentence 1.
9 Federal Constitution (n. 7 above) article 185 section 3 sentence 1.
10 Federal Council, “Coronavirus: Federal Council bans large-scale events”, (28 February 2020), Available at: <https://www.admin.ch/gov/en/start/documentation/me-
dia-releases.msg-id-78289.html>.
11 Federal Council, “Coronavirus: Federal Council declares ‘extraordinary situation’ and introduces more stringent measures”,(16 March 2020), Available at: <https://
www.admin.ch/gov/en/start/documentation/media-releases.msg-id-78454.html>.
12 See « Ordonnance sur l’octroi de crédits et de cautionnements solidaires à la suite du coronavirus », (25 March 2020), Available at: <https://www.fedlex.admin.ch/eli/
oc/2020/194/fr>.
13 For an assessment see Sam Jones, “Swiss lead way with crisis loans to small businesses”, Financial Times, republished at SWI Swissinfo.ch, (6 April 2020). Avail-
able at: <https://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/business/covid-19_swiss-lead-way-with-crisis-loans-to-small-businesses/45670144>.
14 For official data on COVID-19 in Switzerland and Liechtenstein see Swiss Federal Office of Public Health (FOPH), “Status report: Switzerland and Liechtenstein”, 
Available at: <https://www.covid19.admin.ch/en/overview>.
15 Federal Council, “Coronavirus: Move towards normalisation and simplified basic rules to protect the population”, (19 June 2020), Available at: <https://www.admin.
ch/gov/en/start/documentation/media-releases.msg-id-79522.html>.
16 “Federal Act on the Statutory Principles for Federal Council Ordinances on Combating the COVID-19 Epidemic (COVID-19 Act)”, SR 818.102, (25 September 2020), 
Available at: <https://www.fedlex.admin.ch/eli/cc/2020/711/en> (non-official English translation).
17 See FOPH (n. 14 above), “Table on the easing and tightening of measures”, (15 December 2020), Available at: <https://www.bag.admin.ch/dam/bag/en/dokumente/
mt/k-und-i/aktuelle-ausbrueche-pandemien/2019-nCoV/covid-19-tabelle-lockerung.pdf.download.pdf/Easing_of_measures_and_possible_next_steps.pdf> (with an 
overview of all the measures imposed and lifted at the federal level between 27 April and 30 November 2020).
18 See FOPH (n. 14 above).
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persons, Switzerland, as of February 2021, 
fared worse during the entire pandemic than 
neighboring Austria and Germany yet slight-
ly better than France and Italy.19 In view of 
mounting discontent with the considerable 
powers of the Federal Council under the 
EpA, both on the part of the political parties 
and the cantons, the federal executive branch 
shied away from reintroducing the ‘extraor-
dinary situation’ and left the ‘special situa-
tion’ in place instead. The Federal Council 
thus might still impose measures aimed at 
individuals or at the population but is un-
der an obligation to consult the cantons be-
forehand.20 Furthermore, each canton could 
enact its own additional measures. Still, the 
small scale of Swiss federalism – 26 cantons 
are assembled on less than 42,000 km2 in-
habited by 8.7 million people – prompted 
many executive branches of the cantons, 
whose members are all elected directly by 
the people, to refrain from unilaterally im-
posing more restrictive and often unpopular 
measures despite increasing case numbers 
on their territory.
4. The silence of the courts
In spite of the severe restrictions of funda-
mental rights, courts have played a sub-
ordinate role at best during the pandemic. 
Although the Federal Court, Switzerland’s 
highest court, had to adjudicate a num-
ber of appeals against measures to combat 
COVID-19 these proved to be manifestly 
unfounded to the extent that the court entered 
into the merits of the appeals at all. In con-
trast, some administrative courts of the can-
tons did in fact rule on the delimitation of the 
emergency powers of the executive branches 
of the cantons.21 The Administrative Court 
of the Canton of Zurich held that the re-
quirement to wear hygiene masks in shops 
and shopping centers did not constitute an 
impermissible interference with fundamen-
tal rights.22 Based on federal constitutional 
law, one can identify three major reasons 
for the courts’ silence: First, ordinances of 
the Federal Council may not be challenged 
in courts as such,23 although specific sanc-
tions imposed by officials based on these 
ordinances such as arrests or fines may in-
deed be contested. Second, the Federal Court 
largely deferred to the Federal Council in its 
past decisions defining the limits of execu-
tive emergency powers.24 Third, the Federal 
Constitution commits all courts to adhere to 
federal statutory law, even in the event of a 
conflict with the Federal Constitution.25 
5. Preliminary assessment: diffusing po-
litical accountability by direct democ-
racy, federalism, separation of pow-
ers, and collegiate executive branches 
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel observed 
in 1820 that the ‘owl of Minerva begins its 
flight only with the falling of dusk’26, point-
ing to the fact that phenomena can only be 
explained and evaluated once they have 
passed and become history. To the extent 
that a preliminary assessment of coping 
with COVID-19 from the perspective of 
constitutional law may nonetheless be rea-
sonably ventured even before the pandemic 
has subsided; the main conclusion might be 
that the alignment of Switzerland’s political 
system towards consensus and integration of 
linguistic, confessional and socio-econom-
ic minorities within the country, as under-
pinned by the Federal Constitution and as a 
salient advantage of the Swiss political sys-
tem, comes at the price of the diffusion of po-
litical accountability. Direct democracy, fed-
eralism, the separation of powers between 
Federal Parliament and the Federal Council 
as well as the collegial decision making and 
interaction within the executive branches at 
both federal levels (Federation, cantons) all 
provide politicians not only with loopholes 
to evade political accountability, but also 
rhetorical munition to shift blame onto other 
actors within the political realm.
Owing to the Swiss system of direct democ-
racy, 50,000 citizens are entitled to launch a 
referendum against any federal statutory law 
approved by Federal Parliament.27 Empiri-
cally, such ‘optional referenda’ are launched 
against around a mere 6% of all the legisla-
tive acts that are constitutionally subject to 
this institution of direct democracy.28 Rough-
ly half of all federal acts actually put to an 
‘optional referendum’ have been vetoed at 
the ballot box since 1874.29 
This considerable political uncertainty posed 
by the optional referendum creates strong 
incentives to seek broad parliamentary con-
sensus on important policy issues and forms 
a major factor of Switzerland’s transforma-
tion from a majoritarian to a consensus de-
mocracy. Consensus democracy, however, 
also offers incentives to politicians to avoid 
political responsibility by passing on sensi-
tive issues like a hot potato. Decisions at the 
ballot box on bills or treaties are very rarely 
19 See Our World in Data, “Switzerland: Coronavirus Pandemic Country Profile”, (21 February 2021), Available at: <https://ourworldindata.org/coronavirus/country/swit-
zerland?country=~CHE>.
20 See EpA (n. 1 above) article 6 section 2.
21 Administrative Court of the Canton of Zurich, decision AN.2020.00004, (25 May 2020), Available at: <https://www.zh.ch/de/politik-staat/streitigkeiten-vor-verwal-
tungsgericht/rechtsprechung-des-verwaltungsgerichts/urteile-in-der-entscheiddatenbank-suchen.html>.
22 Ibid., decision AN.2020.00016, (3 December 2020).
23 Federal Constitution (n. 7 above) article 189 section 4.
24 See, e.g., Federal [Supreme] Court, decision BGE 123 IV 29 section 3b, (10 January 1997), Available at: www.bger.ch.
25 Federal Constitution (n. 7 above) article 190; see Johannes Reich, «Verhältnis von Demokratie und Rechtsstaatlichkeit» in Oliver Diggelmann et al. (eds.), Droit consti-
tutionnel suisse. Vol. 1, Schulthess, (2020), 333-55, Available at: https://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-184637.
26 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, «Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts», (1820; Suhrkamp 1986), 28 (translation by the author).
27 Federal Constitution (n. 7 above), article 141 sections 1a&d.
28 Alexander H. Trechsel & Pascal Sciarini, “Direct democracy in Switzerland: Do elites matter?”, 33 European Journal of Political Research 99, (1998), 103-4.
29 Adrian Vatter, “Das politische System der Schweiz”, 3rd ed., Nomos, (2017), 370.
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framed as a vote of no confidence in a mem-
ber of government. Since 1959 not a single 
member of the Federal Council has resigned 
after a referendum that did not go according 
to his or her preferences.
Furthermore, due to the small-scale structure 
of Swiss federalism, a single canton has lit-
tle incentive to unilaterally take potentially 
unpopular decisions. As many persons live 
and work in different cantons, each govern-
ment of a canton can reasonably claim that a 
unilateral decision would be ineffective and 
thereby shift the burden to take unpopular 
decision upon the federal government.
All members of the Federal Council are 
elected by Federal Parliament for a fixed 
period of four years.30 Owing to the lack of 
a vote of no confidence or a recall, political 
parties and their members of Federal Parlia-
ment face little pressure to fall in line with 
decisions taken by the Federal Council or to 
support them in public. With regard to the 
separation of powers between the Federal 
Council and Federal Parliament, the Federal 
Constitution merely provides that ‘signifi-
cant’ and ‘fundamental’ provisions must be 
part of statutory federal law.31 Such law gen-
erally rests outside the scope of judicial re-
view.32 In view of the powers granted to the 
Federal Council by the EpA,33 this provides 
members of parliament with the opportunity 
to put pressure on the executive branch by 
threatening to overrule ordinances enacted 
by the Federal Council and to take credit for 
any adjustments, while avoiding any politi-
cal accountability for such decisions.
The executive branches of both the cantons 
and the Federation are collegiate bodies con-
sisting of an uneven number of members 
with identical rights and responsibilities.34 
Decisions are taken, to the extent possible, 
by consensus and all of the members of the 
executive are expected to faithfully represent 
and implement the decisions by the major-
ity. Ideally, such structures lead to positive 
instead of mere negative coordination35 and 
thus to better informed decisions. At the 
same time, each member of the executive 
branch is provided with an opportunity not 
only to hide behind the collegium but to 
cautiously distance him- or herself from the 
collective decisions or to leak his or her op-
position to the media.
The COVID-19 pandemic thus highlighted 
that the merit of Swiss constitutional law in 
establishing consensus between linguistic, 
confessional, and cultural minorities has its 
shadows. It allows the cantons, members of 
the federal parliament and political parties to 
shirk political responsibility and shift politi-
cal blame onto other actors instead.
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS: GENERAL 
ELECTION OF THE SWISS  
FEDERAL PARLIAMENT
Swiss citizens were called to the ballot 
boxes three times in 2020 to decide upon 
nine subjects.36 None of the proposed four 
amendments to the Federal Constitution, 
all of them popular initiatives, achieved the 
necessary majority of both the voters and 
the cantons.37 The popular initiative ‘For re-
sponsible businesses – to protect people and 
the environment’, was launched by a broad 
coalition of left-leaning parties, NGOs, and 
charitable organizations and brought for-
ward a constitutional amendment to com-
mit all companies with registered offices or 
headquarters in Switzerland to adhere to “in-
ternationally recognized human rights and 
international environmental standards” both 
in Switzerland and abroad and to ensure that 
these standards are “respected by the busi-
nesses under their control”. 
These obligations would have been made en-
forceable through torts claims before Swiss 
courts. The initiative was supported by 50.73% 
of voters but failed to gain a majority of the 
cantons and was thus rejected. The popular 
initiative ‘For moderate immigration (limita-
tion initiative)’, which would have ended free 
movement of persons with the members-states 
of the EU and the European Economic Area, 
met the same fate. The popular initiative was 
roundly rejected by 61.7% of voters and more 
than 80% of the cantons. As popular initiatives 
seeking to commit the Federation to ‘promote 
the supply of affordable rental housing’ 
and to bar the Swiss National Bank, Switzer-
land’s central bank, and pensions funds from 
‘financing producers of military equipment’ 
were both defeated, the Federal Constitution 
remained unaltered in 2020.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES: 
JUDICIALIZATION OF POLITICS, 
ISLAMIC HEADSCARVES, AND 
HOMESCHOOLING
1. Association ‘Senior Women for Climate 
Protection’ et al. vs. Federal Council et 
al.: climate change litigation on its way 
to the European Court of Human Rights38 
‘Senior Women for Climate Protection’ 
(SEPO), an association under Swiss law, 
whose roughly 1,800 members are all female 
and on average 73 years old, and four of its 
members filed a motion seeking to commit 
the Federal Council and three federal admin-
30 Federal Constitution (n. 7 above) article 175 section 2 sentence 1.
31 Federal Constitution (n. 7 above) article 164 section 1.
32 See section I/3 at n. 25.
33 See section I/1 above.
34 See, e.g., Federal Constitution (n. 7 above), articles 175 and 177 sections 1.
35 Fritz W. Scharpf, ‘Komplexität als Schranke der politischen Planung’ in PVS 4/1972: Gesellschaftlicher Wandel und politische Innovation (VS 1972) 168, 173-5 (on 
positive and negative coordination).
36 On all federal popular votes since 1848 see Federal Chancellery, ‘Chronology of referenda. Available at: <https://www.bk.admin.ch/ch/d/pore/va/vab_2_2_4_1.html>.
37 Federal Constitution (n. 7 above) article 140 section 1a & article 142 sections 2-4.
38 Federal Court (n. 24 above) decision 146 I 145 (5 May 2020). Available at: <www.bger.ch>.
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istrative agencies to take more stringent cli-
mate action in such a way that Switzerland’s 
contribution to global emissions of green-
house gases (GHGs) would be in line with 
the aim of the 2015 Paris Agreement to hold 
‘the increase in the global average tempera-
ture to well below 2 °C above pre-industri-
al levels’39. According to SEPO, this would 
mean reducing domestic GHG-emissions 
by at least 25 percent by 2020 compared 
with 1990 levels, instead of 20 percent as 
prescribed in federal statutory law. SEPO 
argued that the federal government, both by 
refraining from initiating a revision of the al-
legedly too lenient climate legislation and by 
ostensibly displaying undue restraint in im-
plementing the statutory provisions, failed to 
meet the positive obligations deriving from 
the right to life and the right to respect for 
private and family life enshrined in both the 
Federal Constitution and the European Con-
vention on Human Rights (ECHR). SEPO 
claimed that elderly women were significant-
ly more and adversely affected in their in-
voked human rights by higher temperatures 
and heat waves caused by GHG-emissions.
On behalf of the Federal Council, the federal 
administration held not to consider SEPO’s 
claim on its merit. The Federal Administra-
tive Court (appellate court) and – on 5 May 
2020 – the Federal Court both affirmed this 
decision.40 The latter court held that the repri-
manded omissions by the federal authorities 
would ‘at the present time’ fail to impair the 
complainants’ rights to life and to respect for 
private and family life to the extent required 
by the Administrative Procedure Act in order 
to vindicate legal remedy. Having exhaust-
ed all domestic remedies, SEPO and four 
of its members filed an application with the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 
on 26 November 2020. SEPO’s motion thus 
arguably constitutes the first case of cli-
mate change litigation reaching the ECtHR 
in strict compliance with the admissibility 
criterion according to which the ‘Court may 
only deal with the matter after all domestic 
remedies have been exhausted’41.
2. Vischer et al. vs. Grand Council of the 
Canton of Basel-City et al.: fundamental 
rights for non-human primates or mere ‘con-
stitutional virtue signaling’?42
In the canton of Basel-City, a hub of life-sci-
ence industry where pharmaceutical giants 
such as Novartis and Roche are headquar-
tered, a popular initiative was submitted 
with the aim of amending the constitution 
of the canton with the following passage: 
‘This constitution guarantees […] the right 
of non-human primates to life and to physi-
cal and mental integrity’. The Grand Coun-
cil of the Canton of Basel-City (Parliament) 
declared the initiative invalid owing to its 
alleged inconsistency with federal law, 
which takes precedence over any law of a 
canton.43 The Court of Appeal of the canton 
overturned this decision. On further appeal, 
the Federal Court upheld this previous de-
cision. The popular initiative ‘basic rights 
for non-human primates’ will thus be put to 
a popular vote. The Federal Court reasoned 
that the cantons are, in their own constitution, 
allowed to guarantee fundamental rights be-
yond the minimum standard set by both the 
Federal Constitution and the ECHR. The 
Federal Court emphasized that the initiative 
did not call for the application of existing 
fundamental rights applicable to humans to 
animals, but rather for the introduction of 
new rights reserved for non-human primates 
only. The Federal Court further underscored 
that fundamental rights would primarily, if 
not exclusively, grant protection against the 
government of the canton and its admin-
istration. Fundamental rights enshrined in 
the constitution of the Canton of Basel-City 
would therefore be directed against the au-
thorities of the canton, including the Univer-
sity of Basel and the University Hospital of 
Basel, and of its municipalities, even though 
these entities currently neither own nor keep 
non-human primates. The Federal Court 
stressed that private law legislation forms an 
exclusive federal power. Subjects of private 
law, in particular life-science industry with 
its laboratories and other private research 
institutions, would therefore not be bound 
by the constitutional amendment the popu-
lar initiative advanced. As a result, the con-
stitutional amendment would largely fail to 
create any third-party effects among private 
entities. Against this backdrop, the decision 
of the Federal Court illustrates the favorable 
conditions for regulatory experimentation 
and innovation that the interaction of feder-
alism and popular initiatives creates. Still, 
the popular initiative, if approved, would es-
sentially be reduced to what may be coined 
‘constitutional virtue signaling’ but largely 
fail to be of practical relevance.
IV. LOOKING AHEAD
On 7 March 2021, Swiss citizens will be 
called to the ballot box to decide on the popu-
lar initiative ‘Yes to the Veiling Ban’ seeking 
to prohibit all face covering in public plac-
es and in places opened to the public, with 
the exception of places of worship. Despite 
its neutral wording, the initiative primarily 
seeks to outlaw wearing specific Islamic fe-
male dresses, in particular the burqa and the 
niqab, in public. On 13 June 2021, citizens 
will vote on the referendum against the ‘Fed-
eral COVID-19 Act’ which was passed as an 
emergency federal statutory law and enacted 
immediately before an optional referendum 
could take place.
39 Paris Agreement (12 December 2015; ratified by Switzerland on 6 October 2017), article 2 section 1a.
40 For a critical assessment see Johannes Reich, Case Note, 121 (2020) Schweizerisches Zentralblatt für Staats- und Verwaltungsrecht, 489-507. Available 
at: <https://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-190231>.
41 ECHR, article 35 section 1.
42 Federal Court (n. 24 above) decision 1C_105/2019 (10 January 1997). Available at: <www.bger.ch>.
43 See Federal Constitution (n. 7 above) article 49 section 1.
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